This page is dedicated to the explanation of the philosophy of Edelex, first with regards to epistemology, then metaethics, then metaphysics, and finally, theology.
Epistemology
Edelist epistemology roughly aligns with phenomenal conservatism (PC). Phenomenal conservatism states that if P 'seems' to be S, then in the absence of defeaters, we can assume that P is S. In terms of the burden of proof, we could see it as the idea that seeming is a reason to accept a positive claim.
This aligns with all modern-day scientific discoveries: ultimately, evidence is still a seeming. For example, our evidence that dinosaurs exist is that there seems to be skeletons that seem to align with our understanding of dinosaurs. We technically could be wrong and the evidence be a hallucination, but as the evidence seems to be valid, and we have no reason to believe it is not, we conclude that it is. It is important to note the 'in the absence of defeaters' part, as it could be said that the earth seems to be flat, therefore under PC, it is. Rather, PC would state that it would be reasonable to conclude that the earth was flat until we knew it wasn't through things like Foucault's pendulum.
Metaethics
Edelist metaethics is moral realist, meaning it believes that there are objective facts about morality.
Moral realism follows from phenomenal conservatism, as it generally seems to us that moral properties exist. However, there are some potential defeaters.
One that directly addresses PC says that while it seems to us that moral properties exist, they can exist subjectively, that is, statements like 'killing people is wrong' can be true, just not objectively. To this, I have to make a point about error theory (the position that claims that all moral statements, such as 'theft is wrong', are incorrect) that will carry over to another point made in this section later on. If morality is entirely subjective, then it is objectively true, as in, true in the objective realm, that all actions are morally neutral or that moral properties don't exist. By making a subjective moral claim, you are therefore contradicting objective reality, and all moral claims must be considered incorrect. The earth is objectively round, so it's wrong to say that it is flat, even if that's your subjective opinion. Similarly, if moral properties objectively don't exist, then statements that act as if they do are incorrect. Therefore to be an anti-realist you have to be an error theorist.
Another, related to Mackie's error theory, claims that moral statements are fundamentally flawed by virtue of being irreducibly normative. This can be easily explained in an example:
"We shouldn't kill innocent people."
"Why?"
"Because it's harmful and they don't deserve it."
"And what's wrong with harming people and how are you deciding who deserves it?"
"Because harm is wrong."
"Why?"
"Because... uhh... it's harmful which is wrong."
In other words, moral claims lead back to an irreducible claim like 'harm is wrong'. I will not refute that moral claims have this property, but rather state that it is not a valid reason to reject them, due to an argument called the companions in guilt argument.
"We should believe that the earth is round."
"Why?"
"Because we have empirical evidence to suggest it."
"And why should be believe that empirical evidence?"
"Because empirical evidence gets us to the truth."
"And why do you believe that?"
"Because we have empirical evidence suggesting it."
Ultimately, epistemic claims also require a reduction to a statement like 'empirical evidence gets us to the truth'. So, if you're going to make that objection to moral realism, you also have to reject epistemic realism: the idea that properties of true and false are objective. But my point before about accepting error theory if you're a moral anti-realist also applies to epistemology. Epistemic error theory is self-defeating because it states that the properties of truth and falseness do not exist, and therefore your reasoning to reach epistemic and moral error theory is defeated, as they require the premises of your argument being true. So, if you take this rejection of moral realism, you have to reject all the claims that led you to your conclusion, thus destroying your own argument.
Metaphysics
Edelist metaphysics align largely with Objectivism. It states that to be conscious is to be conscious of something. The subjective experience that the subjectivist claims is entirely made up only exists once and after a human is first conscious, as even dreams require a foundation. When you are first conscious, you are conscious of something. It cannot be something within your subjective experience, your mind, as that subjective experience does not exist yet, due to the lack of a foundation for it. Therefore at the very least the first human perception is of something external, and therefore objective, as it is outside of the subject.