This page is dedicated to the explanation of the philosophy of Edelex, first with regards to epistemology, then metaethics, then ontology and philosophy of mind.
Epistemology
Edelexian epistemology is empiricist. It states that the part of the mind which experiences is that which makes us conscious, and so the fundamental part of the mind needed even before reasoning is experience. It is sceptical of inductive reasoning (reasoning from generalisation, for example reasoning that the sun will rise tomorrow because it has for so long consistently) due to Hume's problem of induction. For this reason it also does not believe in causation. It also takes Hume's sceptical argument against deductive reasoning: to conclude with 100% certainty that you are correct, you must be 100% certain that you are in a state in which you can conclude accurately (for example, a drunk person will not be very good at maths a lot of the time). However, to believe that this is true, you must conclude that you are in a fit state to accurately conclude that you are in a fit state to solve a maths problem. You end up with an infinite regress which cannot be solved. You cannot then say that your reasoning has been accurate in the past and so it will be now without relying on induction. Edelexian philosophy does not, however, state that reasoning is useless or we can avoid it. It accepts its inevitability, and that it can discover truth (in cases of analytic truths at least). It is simply sceptical, and states we cannot certainly know such truths derived from it. For inductive reasoning, while it accepts its utility, it never accepts its validity.
Edelexianism is somewhat sceptical of the external world. It is arguably direct realist (specifically taking a modern representationalist view, not to be confused with sense-datum theory), and so usually would not be, however it accepts the fallibility of the reasoning used to reach the conclusion of direct realism. It flips the argument from illusion on its head for indirect realist: you can be mistaken about sense-data due to illusions, whereas the direct realist can simply appeal to mistakes about the world being down to higher-level cognitive processes rather than perception.
It accepts an epistemic theory of truth, specifically relativism.
Metaethics
Edelist metaethics aligns with error theory. This means it has three main claims:
1. Ethical sentences (like 'murder is wrong') express truth-apt propositions (they can be true/false) describing obligations/categorical reasons.
2. There are no such obligations.
3. All moral claims are false.
It believes this for a few reasons. The first point is justified by the Frege-Geach problem. Let's say noncognitivism (the view that ethical sentences are not truth-apt, and instead represent claims like 'Boo! Murder!') is true. How do we make sense of statements like 'She doesn't yet realise that murder is wrong', or 'If murder is wrong, then stealing is wrong'? As for the second premise, the burden of proof is on the realist. However, I do have a specific argument for it. Let's say that there is an obligation to not murder. This must also mean that you have a categorical reason/obligation to conclude that you ought not murder; after all, if you could unproblematically disregard a true moral claim as false then you're justified in believing it's false and therefore not abiding by it. And yet, in almost any moral system, one can construct a claim in which you ought not conclude that the moral system is true (for example if someone put a chip in your brain which detects if you conclude that utilitarianism is true and if you do a city explodes). If you create an exception for that case, you are effectively adding that as a rule, creating another hole. There is more to the argument which will be added later. 3 follows from 1 and 2; 'the unicorn is blue' is false because there are no unicorns.
These obligations for concluding are called epistemic norms, and are often used by the realist to argue for realism, in various different contexts. Here are some problems with them or reasons they don't need to exist.
1. Their role can be fulfilled descriptively. You don't need 'you ought to conclude that the earth is round', or even a hypothetical/desire-dependent variant when you have 'concluding that the earth is round brings your conclusions closer to the truth'.
2. The liar paradox disproves them; what ought I conclude about 'this statement is false'?
Additionally, some people, both moral realists and antirealists, believe in instrumental/hypothetical oughts/norms, however I do not. These take the form of 'If I want X, I ought to do what achieves X'. These do not account for the complex nature of desires.
Finally, Hume's problem of induction and causal antirealism would make morality very strange - it could be immoral to punch someone but not to shoot them, for example, due to different chains of causal relations.
Ontology and philosophy of mind
It is not fully developed yet. This section will be updated.